Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Martin Dufwenberg
Author-Name-First: Martin 
Author-Name-Last: Dufwenberg
Author-Email:  martind@eller.arizona.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Arizona

Author-Name:  Paul Feldman
Author-Name-First: Paul
Author-Name-Last: Feldman
Author-Workplace-Name: Texas A&M University

Author-Name: Maros Servatka
Author-Name-First: Maros
Author-Name-Last: Servatka
Author-Email:  maros.servatka@mgsm.edu.au
Author-Workplace-Name: Macquarie Business School, University of Alaska Anchorage

Author-Name: Jorge Tarraso
Author-Name-First: Jorge
Author-Name-Last: Tarraso
Author-Email:  jorge.tarraso@gmail.com
Author-Workplace-Name: Libretto

Author-Name: Radovan Vadovic
Author-Name-First: Radovan
Author-Name-Last: Vadovic
Author-Email:  radovan.vadovic@carleton.ca
Author-Workplace-Name: Carleton University

Title: Honesty in the City

Abstract: Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkable degree of trustworthiness, even with price-haggling which was predicted to reduce trustworthiness. 
 
Creation-date: 2022-11 
Number: 2022-03
Handle: RePEc:ala:wpaper:2022-03
File-URL: http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA202203.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Classification-JEL: C72, C90, C93, D91  
Keywords: trustworthiness, honesty, reciprocity, field experiment, haggling, taxis, Mexico City