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Abstract

We conducted a natural field experiment at a local toy store in Anchorage, Alaska to estimate the potential impact on consumer behavior and business revenues when the firm's charitable donation is conditional on the total dollar amount of the individual transaction. Results suggest that there was a modest increase in sales revenue as a result of the donation offer, however it is unlikely that the additional profits offset the cost of the donations.

1. Introduction

Milton Friedman famously argued that "There is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits" (Friedman 1970). He was not suggesting that firms entirely refrain from socially beneficial practices, rather that they only do so when it is in the long-run interests of the business. These practices are not necessarily in conflict with a firm's goal of profit maximization if they satisfy the social preferences of stakeholders (investors, employees and consumers), or if used to influence public policies that might affect shareholder wealth (Kitzmuller and Shimshack 2012). When American Express campaigned to restore Ellis Island's Statute of Liberty in 1983, they successfully raised $1.7 million in revenues for restoration while also increasing card use by 37% and new memberships by 10% (Kotler and Lee, 2005), which is consistent with the idea that some firms may use CSR strategically. Surveys indicate that many consumers prefer to purchase from firms engaged in ethical and socially-responsible practices and will pay a premium for their products, and many individuals prefer to work for socially responsible firms (Nielsen 2014; Aflac 2019). In response to consumer demand, firms may use CSR initiatives to differentiate their products in competitive environments (Kotler and Lee, 2005; Bohe and Cruz 2010; Fernández-Kranz and Santaló 2010; Ding et al 2020). Today, 80% of the world's top firms report on their sustainability and social responsibility practices (KMPG 2020).[1]

Cause-related marketing is a type of CSR initiative in which firms link purchases to socially responsible activities such as charitable donations, or fair trade and environmentally-sound practices. Some examples include the shoe store TOMS which donates one-third of profits

[1] See Kitzmuller and Shimshack 2012, Crifo and Forget 2015, and Schmitz and Schrader 2015, for reviews of the CSR literature.

to charity,[2] Warby Parker which donates a pair of eyeglasses with every purchase,[3] and Product (Red) which partners with firms to support public health programs worldwide.[4] Elfenbein and McManus (2010) find that prices in eBay auctions are 6% higher when a portion of the payment goes to charity. Elfenbein et al. (2010) also find higher prices, higher sale probabilities and fewer customer complaints when the transaction is linked with a charitable donation. Similarly, McManus and Bennet (2011) report that consumers in an online experiment responded positively when their purchase could generate revenue for a charity, and consumers in a field experiment were willing to pay a 10% premium for fair trade coffee (Hainmuller et al. 2015). Other experimental research draws similar conclusions about consumers' willingness to pay a premium or alter their consumption when purchases are bundled with a socially responsible cause (Koppel and Schulze 2008; Vlaeminck et al. 2014). On the other hand, in a lab experiment, Feicht et al. (2016) find that seller offers to make a charitable donation had no effect on prices or profits. In a meta-analysis of over 200 studies, Margolis et al (2009) conclude that these CSR initiatives do have a positive, but small, impact on a firm's financial performance. Orlitzky et al. (2003) draw similar conclusions in their meta-analysis.

Our paper uses a natural field experiment to test whether linking a charitable donation to the total amount of the transaction (rather than as a percent of profits or revenue) impacts sales. We partnered with an independently owned and operated specialty toy store in Anchorage, Alaska over 10 days during the peak Christmas holiday shopping season. Customers in the two treatment groups were informed that the store would make a charitable donation if the total purchase exceeded a threshold. Results suggest that there was a modest increase in sales revenue as a result of the donation offer, however it is unlikely that the additional profits offset the cost of the donations.

2. Experimental Design

The Anchorage toy store is a small (about 1700 square feet of retail space), centrally-located business that sells high-end children's products. Its inventory consists of over 15,000 different toys, ranging from unique boutique to the industry's top brands. It is a member of the American

[2] https://www.toms.com/us/about-toms.html
[3] https://www.warbyparker.com/buy-a-pair-give-a-pair
[4] https://www.red.org/how-red-works

Specialty Toy Retailing Association, and similar to most toy stores, it does a majority of its business towards the end of the calendar year. Anchorage is the largest city in Alaska, with a population of about 290,000 people. Median household income ($85,000) is about 35% higher than the US national average ($63,000).[5] Neither Anchorage nor the state of Alaska has a sales or consumption tax.

The study consisted of three treatments. Upon entering the store, customers in the Donate $2 and Donate $4 treatments were informed that if their transaction exceeded $40, then the store would donate either $2 or $4 (depending on treatment) to Toys for Tots, up to a total of $4500. Toys for Tots is a program run by the United States Marine Corps Reserve which distributes toys during the Christmas season to children in low-income households. Having the toy store donate to this program has a strong brand-cause linkage which previous research has shown to be associated with more positive consumer attitudes and response to the program (Pracejus and Olsen 2004; Chéron et al. 2012; Zasuwa 2017). Since previous research shows that larger donation sizes are associated with greater customer response (Moosmayer and Fuljahn 2010), we hypothesize that the effects in the Donate $4 treatment will be stronger than in Donate $2.

Customers were handed a card explaining the offer (Figure 1 shows the Donate $2 offer), and an employee verbally explained the donation offer. There were also larger flyers at the entrance and the registers. The $40 threshold for the donation was based on the $39.99 median sales revenue per transaction over the same period in the prior year. There was no other advertising of the promotion; customers learned about it when they entered the store. For customers in the Control group, there was no mention of Toys for Tots or the donation offer.

It was impractical to randomly assign individual customers to a treatment, so we instead assigned treatments based on the time the customer entered the store. To minimize possible time of day or date effects, treatments were assigned such that they were as evenly distributed as possible both across time blocks within a day, and across days within a time block (Table 1).

3. Results

The data include 3036 transactions over the 10 days before Christmas (December 14-24) which are summarized in Table 2.[6] The data include the transaction date and time, item(s) purchased,

[5] https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/anchoragemunicipalityalaska,US/POP010220
[6] Data excludes 63 transactions that included a return.

the department to which each item belonged, and its price. Our analysis aggregates the individual item level data to the transaction level, which allows us to test our primary hypothesis, which is that the two donation treatments will increase the proportion of sales above the $40 threshold. Post-experiment discussions with store sales staff suggested that the treatments may have influenced the types of items purchased, so we then test these conjectures.

Table 2 shows that, in the Control treatment, the median transaction amount was $41.98, and the mean was $59.58. Just over half (52%) of the transactions in the Control exceeded the $40 threshold. These outcomes were comparable to the prior year, which had median and mean transaction amounts of $39.99 and $60.09, respectively. Consistent with our hypothesis, relative to the Control, the proportion of transactions that qualified for the donation was 10% higher (57% of transactions) in the Donate $2 treatment, and 8% higher (56%) in the Donate $4 treatment (see Figure 2 for the distribution of transaction amounts by treatment). A Fisher exact test of proportions confirms that both differences are statistically significant (p=0.014 and p=0.067, respectively). However, contrary to expectations, there is no statistically significant difference between the two donation treatments (p=0.470). Although the contexts are different, this is broadly consistent with the results in Karlan and List (2007); their results suggest that the presence of a matching grant increases charitable donations, but increasing the match ratio had no additional impact.

Consistent with an increased share of transactions exceeding $40, the mean transaction amount increased by about $4 (~8%) in each donation treatment, and the median increased by about $5 (~12%). Nonparametric K-sample tests of medians (p=0.043 and p=0.056, respectively) and t-tests of the means (p=0.088 and p=0.080, respectively) indicate that these differences are statistically significant. Again, there is no difference between the two donation treatments in the median (p=0.779) or mean (p=0.935) transaction amounts.

We supplement the unconditional analysis above with a series of regression models presented in Tables 3-6. In all tables, the constant references the Control group. In Models 1 and 2, the dummy variables Donate $2 and Donate $4 reference the two donation treatments. Models 2 and 4 add fixed effects for both date and time block to help control for unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with the timing of treatment and the outcomes of interest. Since we find no statistically significant difference between the two donation treatments, Models 3 and 4 combine these two treatments into a single treatment variable.

Since the data have the date and time of the transaction, not the time when the customer entered the store, it is possible that customers were shopping in the store during the change in treatments. Also, it is possible that the treatments were most likely to influence those customers whose transaction might otherwise have been just below the $40 threshold, and nudged them to add enough items to exceed $40. We expect that the treatments were unlikely to influence those individuals who were already planning to make a large purchase substantially in excess of $40. To explore these conjectures, Models 5-8 repeat the analysis in Models 1-4 while omitting those transactions that occurred in the first 10 minutes of the treatment time block and had transaction amounts exceeding $75.[7]

Table 3 presents the results from a series of linear probability models which estimate the probability that a transaction exceeded $40. Consistent with our main hypothesis, Models 1 and 3 show that the donation treatments yielded a statistically significant increase in the proportion of transactions that exceeded $40. However, this effect mostly disappears when date and time fixed effects are included in Models 2 and 4. Models 5-8 yield similar conclusions (exceptions are that Donate $2 in Model 6, and Donate $2 or $4 in Model 8 are weakly significant).

Table 4 uses linear regression models to estimate the total transaction amount. When all data are included, and the two donation treatments are combined, Model 3 shows a significant treatment effect, and as with Table 3, the effect disappears when fixed effects are included. However, when the analysis omits transactions that occurred in the first 10 minutes of the time block and were over $75 (Models 5-8), the treatment effects in all models are statistically significant.

The results in Tables 3 and 4 collectively suggest that there may be a modest effect at the margin, but the evidence is mixed. Sales staff provided multiple anecdotes of customers, while at the register, grabbing one or two low cost items to ensure that their purchase met the $40 threshold. Consistent with these anecdotal observations, Table 2 shows a slight increase in the mean number of items sold in the donation treatments (from 3.9 in the Control to 4.3 and 4.2 in the Donate $2 and Donate $4 treatments, respectively). We explore this more formally in two ways. First, Table 5 presents the results of a Poisson model which estimates the total number of items purchased in a transaction (using the same independent variables as Tables 3 and 4).

[7] The Appendix contains a series of tables that conduct a sensitivity analysis around both the times and transaction amounts that were excluded.

Results in all models show a positive and significant effect of the donation treatments. Second, Table 6 uses a Poisson model to estimate the total number of items purchased that were under $5. These low-priced items typically have high profit margins, conveniently placed at the registers to encourage impulse purchases. Examples include plastic toy animals, dice, cards, balloon cars & boats, finger fidgetz, rubber band cars, stickers, balls and whacky whirlers. All models indicate a statistically significant increase in the number of sub-$5 items purchased during the treatment periods.

4. Discussion

Overall, the results suggest that when a firm offers to make a charitable donation if the total purchase exceeds a threshold, this may have a modest effect on behavior at the margin. There is strong evidence that the donation offers increased the number of low-price items (under $5) sold.

Whether this partnership with Toys for Tots was "win-win" for the store in the sense that the additional profit from the increase in sales offset the cost of the donation depends upon (1) the net profit from the additional items purchased, and (2) the cost of the donations from transactions that would have exceeded the threshold anyway. In the Control, 52% of the transactions exceeded $40 (Table 2). If we assume that, in the absence of the donation offer, the same 52% percent would apply to the 2013 transactions in the two donation treatments combined, then there would have been 1047 over-$40 transactions, rather than the 1138 we observed (*i.e.*, an additional 91 transactions due to the donation offer). The average transaction amount in both treatment groups was about $4 higher than the Control (Table 2), which would imply an additional $364 in revenue from these 91 additional transactions in the two treatments.

As a result of the program, the stored donated $3502 to Toys for Tots.[8] Clearly, the approximately $364 in additional sales revenue was insufficient to offset this donation. We do not have the store's cost data. If we assume that most of the 91 additional purchases were for low-cost, high-margin items, then it is likely that the store more or less broke even on the donations that resulted from these additional purchases. Therefore, the primary reason this program was not win-win for the toy store was because of the donations on the 1047 transactions that would have exceeded the $40 threshold even without a donation offer. Pracejus and Olsen

[8] 525 over-$40 transactions × $2 donation = $1050, plus 613 over-$40 transactions × $4 donation = $2452.

(2004) also report that the increased sales from their high brand-cause fit cause-related marketing program were insufficient to offset the cost of donations.

There are some factors that could influence conclusions about the broader impact of this type of donation offer. First, the design varied the treatments throughout the day which meant there was no practical way to advertise the program outside the store. If this donation were offered to all customers during the holiday season, the store could have promoted it more widely which could have induced additional customers to shop at the store, rather than at a competitor. Second, the donation offer could generate goodwill that creates long-term customer loyalty. Van Den Brink et al. (2006) find that brand loyalty is stronger with long-term commitments to a cause-related marketing initiative. Finally, this was a time-limited campaign during the Christmas season; it is unclear whether the effects would persist if the donation program operated year-round.

The presence of the $40 threshold gave customers a clear target to reach when deciding how much to spend, and there is evidence to suggest this nudged some of the customers who were close to the margin to purchase enough additional items to reach that threshold. However, this comes at a significant cost in terms of donations on transactions at higher dollar amounts that were not influenced by the treatments. The store's $40 threshold was based on the median transaction amount the prior year, and future research could explore whether a higher threshold would have a similar impact on behavior while reducing the cost of donations.

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Table 1. Schedule of Treatments by Time and Day

	STORE HOURS				
DATE	10:00-11:59	12:00-13:59	14:00-15:59	16:00-17:59	18:00-19:59
Dec 14	$4	$2	Control	$4	$2
Dec 15	$2	Control	$4	$2	Control
Dec 16	$4	Control	$2	Control	$4
Dec 17	Control	$4	$2	$4	Control
Dec 18	$2	$4	Control	$2	$4
Dec 19	Control	$2	$4	Control	-
Dec 20	$2	Control	$4	-	-
Dec 21	$2	$4	Control	$4	$2
Dec 22	$4	$2	Control	$2	$4
Dec 23	Control	$4	$2	Control	$2
Dec 24	$4	Control	-	-	-

Table 2. Summary Statistics (per transaction)

Treatment	**N**	**Mean**	**Std Error**	**Median**	**< $40**	**≥ $40**	**Mean # Items**
Control	1023	$59.58	$1.80	$41.98	493 (48%)	530 (52%)	3.9
Donate $2	914	$64.10	$1.95	$46.98	389 (43%)	525 (57%)	4.3
Donate $4	1099	$64.34	$2.02	$46.90	486 (44%)	613 (56%)	4.2

Excludes 63 transactions with a return.

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Pr(Transaction Amount >$40)

	All Data				Omits first 10 minutes & transactions >$75			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Donate $2	0.06**	0.04			0.06**	0.05*		
	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.04*	0.03			0.05*	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4 combined			0.05**	0.03			0.06**	0.05*
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.52***	0.58***			0.35***	0.42***	0.35***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.05)			(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Date & Time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3036	3036	3036	3036	2015	2015	2015	2015

Table 4. Linear Regression Model: Total Transaction Amount

	All Data				Omits first 10 minutes & transactions >$75			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Donate $2	4.52	2.94			2.53**	2.16*		
	(2.80)	(2.94)			(1.08)	(1.14)		
Donate $4	4.75*	4.31			2.15**	1.97*		
	(2.67)	(2.76)			(1.03)	(1.06)		
Donate $2 or $4 combined			4.65**	3.72			2.32**	2.05**
			(2.36)	(2.47)			(0.91)	(0.95)
Constant	59.58***	63.42***	59.58***	63.31***	33.31***	36.65***	33.31***	36.66***
	(1.92)	(5.62)	(1.92)	(5.61)	(0.74)	(2.16)	(0.74)	(2.16)
Date & Time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3036	3036	3036	3036	2015	2015	2015	2015

Table 5. Poisson Model: Number of Items Purchased

	All Data				Omits first 10 minutes & transactions >$75			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Donate $2	0.10***	0.07***			0.10***	0.08**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.04)		
Donate $4	0.09***	0.07***			0.08***	0.08**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4 combined			0.10***	0.07***			0.09***	0.08***
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	1.35***	1.44***	1.35***	1.44***	0.98***	1.26***	0.98***	1.26***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Date & Time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3036	3036	3036	3036	2015	2015	2015	2015

Table 6. Poisson Model: Number of <$5 Items Purchased

	All Data				Omits first 10 minutes & transactions >$75			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Donate $2	0.16***	0.13***			0.14**	0.11*		
	(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $4	0.16***	0.16***			0.19***	0.20***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $2 or $4 combined			0.16***	0.15***			0.17***	0.16***
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.02	0.16*	-0.02	0.15*	-0.28***	0.28***	-0.28***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Date & Time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3036	3036	3036	3036	2015	2015	2015	2015

Figure 1. Card Describing the $2 Donation Offer

The card for the $4 donation offer was similar – only the donation amount changed.

Figure 2. Distribution of Transaction Amounts by Treatment (transactions < $100)



Appendix – Sensitivity Analysis for Tables 3-6

For each table, we first vary the time omitted (first 5, 10, 15 20 minutes) of treatment block. We then vary the dollar amounts omitted (≥$70, ≥$75, ≥$80, ≥$85).

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits first 5 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $4	0.03	0.02		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.05**	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.52***	0.59***	0.52***	0.59***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2890	2890	2890	2890

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits first 10 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $4	0.04*	0.03		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.05**	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.52***	0.58***	0.52***	0.58***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2757	2757	2757	2757

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits first 15 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.05**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.04*	0.03		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.05**	0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.52***	0.59***	0.52***	0.59***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2637

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits first 20 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.04*	0.03		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.03	0.02		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.04*	0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.53***	0.60***	0.53***	0.60***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2519	2519	2519	2519

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Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits transactions ≥$70)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.05**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.06***	0.04*
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.43***	0.35***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits transactions ≥$75)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.05**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.06***	0.04*
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.43***	0.35***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits transactions ≥$80)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.05**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.06***	0.04*
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.43***	0.35***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 3. Linear Probability Model: Transaction is >$40 (omits transactions ≥$85)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.06**	0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.05**	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.06***	0.04*
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.35***	0.43***	0.35***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

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Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits first 5 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	5.22*	3.63		
	(2.87)	(3.02)		
Donate $4	4.58*	4.01		
	(2.75)	(2.83)		
Donate $2 or $4			4.87**	3.85
			(2.43)	(2.54)
Constant	59.29***	62.86***	59.29***	62.83***
	(1.98)	(5.80)	(1.98)	(5.79)
Observations	2890	2890	2890	2890

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits first 10 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	5.05*	3.51		
	(2.96)	(3.11)		
Donate $4	4.92*	4.22		
	(2.83)	(2.92)		
Donate $2 or $4			4.98**	3.91
			(2.50)	(2.61)
Constant	59.53***	62.65***	59.53***	62.59***
	(2.04)	(5.94)	(2.04)	(5.94)
Observations	2757	2757	2757	2757

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits first 15 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	4.34	2.97		
	(3.00)	(3.14)		
Donate $4	4.94*	4.58		
	(2.88)	(2.95)		
Donate $2 or $4			4.66*	3.88
			(2.53)	(2.64)
Constant	59.72***	63.72***	59.72***	63.59***
	(2.06)	(6.04)	(2.06)	(6.03)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2637

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits first 20 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	3.67	2.57		
	(3.10)	(3.25)		
Donate $4	3.80	3.67		
	(2.97)	(3.05)		
Donate $2 or $4			3.74	3.19
			(2.62)	(2.72)
Constant	60.68***	63.80***	60.68***	63.68***
	(2.13)	(6.32)	(2.13)	(6.31)
Observations	2519	2519	2519	2519

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Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits transactions ≥$70)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	2.47**	1.90*		
	(1.03)	(1.08)		
Donate $4	2.08**	1.83*		
	(0.98)	(1.01)		
Donate $2 or $4			2.26***	1.86**
			(0.86)	(0.91)
Constant	33.40***	37.29***	33.40***	37.30***
	(0.70)	(2.06)	(0.70)	(2.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits transactions ≥$75)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	2.47**	1.90*		
	(1.03)	(1.08)		
Donate $4	2.08**	1.83*		
	(0.98)	(1.01)		
Donate $2 or $4			2.26***	1.86**
			(0.86)	(0.91)
Constant	33.40***	37.29***	33.40***	37.30***
	(0.70)	(2.06)	(0.70)	(2.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits transactions ≥$80)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	2.47**	1.90*		
	(1.03)	(1.08)		
Donate $4	2.08**	1.83*		
	(0.98)	(1.01)		
Donate $2 or $4			2.26***	1.86**
			(0.86)	(0.91)
Constant	33.40***	37.29***	33.40***	37.30***
	(0.70)	(2.06)	(0.70)	(2.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 4. Total Transaction Amount (omits transactions ≥$85)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	2.47**	1.90*		
	(1.03)	(1.08)		
Donate $4	2.08**	1.83*		
	(0.98)	(1.01)		
Donate $2 or $4			2.26***	1.86**
			(0.86)	(0.91)
Constant	33.40***	37.29***	33.40***	37.30***
	(0.70)	(2.06)	(0.70)	(2.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

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Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits first 5 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $4	0.08***	0.06***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.07***
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.35***	1.46***	1.35***	1.46***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Observations	2890	2890	2890	2890

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits first 10 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $4	0.08***	0.06***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.07***
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.36***	1.47***	1.36***	1.48***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2757	2757	2757	2757

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits first 15 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.10***	0.08***		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.07***	0.06**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.07***
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.36***	1.51***	1.36***	1.51***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2637

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits first 20 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.10***	0.07***		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.06***	0.05**		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.08***	0.06***
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.37***	1.55***	1.37***	1.55***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Observations	2519	2519	2519	2519

****

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits transactions ≥$70)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.08**	0.07**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.08***
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.98***	1.22***	0.98***	1.22***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits transactions ≥$75)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.08**	0.07**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.08***
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.98***	1.22***	0.98***	1.22***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits transactions ≥$80)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.08**	0.07**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.08***
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.98***	1.22***	0.98***	1.22***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 5. Poisson: Number of Items Purchased (omits transactions ≥$85)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.11***	0.08**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $4	0.08**	0.07**		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.09***	0.08***
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.98***	1.22***	0.98***	1.22***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

****

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits first 5 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.18***	0.16***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $4	0.18***	0.18***		
	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.18***	0.17***
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.03	0.19**	-0.03	0.19**
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Observations	2890	2890	2890	2890

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits first 10 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.18***	0.16***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $4	0.18***	0.18***		
	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.18***	0.17***
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.04	0.22***	-0.04	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Observations	2757	2757	2757	2757

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits first 15 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.24***	0.22***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $4	0.17***	0.18***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.20***	0.20***
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.06	0.24***	-0.06	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2637

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits first 20 minutes)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.22***	0.21***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $4	0.18***	0.19***		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.20***	0.20***
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.05	0.33***	-0.05	0.33***
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Observations	2519	2519	2519	2519

****

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits transactions ≥$70)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.16***	0.13**		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $4	0.16***	0.18***		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.16***	0.15***
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.27***	0.21**	-0.27***	0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits transactions ≥$75)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.16***	0.13**		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $4	0.16***	0.18***		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.16***	0.15***
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.27***	0.21**	-0.27***	0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits transactions ≥$80)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.16***	0.13**		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $4	0.16***	0.18***		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.16***	0.15***
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.27***	0.21**	-0.27***	0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218

Table 6. Poisson: Number of Items <$5 Purchased (omits transactions ≥$85)

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3	(4) Model 4
Donate $2	0.16***	0.13**		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $4	0.16***	0.18***		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Donate $2 or $4			0.16***	0.15***
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.27***	0.21**	-0.27***	0.21**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Observations	2218	2218	2218	2218