Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Cary Deck
Author-Name-First: 
Author-Name-Last: 
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Alabama

Author-Name: Lance Howe
Author-Name-First: Lance
Author-Name-Last: Howe
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Alaska Anchorage

Author-Name: Matthew Reimer
Author-Name-First: Matthew
Author-Name-Last: Reimer
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Alaska Anchorage

Author-Name: Jonathan Alevy
Author-Name-First: Jonathan
Author-Name-Last: Alevy
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Alaska Anchorage

Author-Name: Kyle Borash
Author-Name-First: Kyle
Author-Name-Last: Borash
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Alaska Anchorage

Title: Contests for Shares of an Uncertain Resource
Abstract: The process of allocating rights to resources can be viewed as a contest: parties compete with each other for the right to claim a larger allocation.  In some situations, the amount of the resource that is available to allocate may be unknown when parties are competing for shares and perhaps not realized until contestants actually attempt to claim their shares of the resource.  For example, fishing quotas may be awarded based on estimated fish populations, but if there are fewer fish than anticipated, those who are last to harvest may not be able to fill their quota. We model contests of this form and test the predictions of the model using a controlled laboratory experiment.  The general result is that participants compete less intensively for shares of the resource when uncertainty regarding the size of the prize is resolved later in the process.

Classification-JEL: C7, C9, D7, Q2
Keywords: Contests with Uncertain Prizes, Fisheries, Experimental Economics

Creation-Date: 2020-03

Number: 2020-02

File-URL: http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA202002.pdf

File-Format: Application/pdf

Handle: RePEc:ala:wpaper:2020-02